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100 N.C. L. REV. 883 (2022)

“Because of Sex”: Title VII’s Failures Leave Legal Sex Workers
Unprotected*
Society’s views towards sex, sexual expression, and gender roles are shifting, as
is the public’s perception of sex work. Movements calling for the
decriminalization of prostitution are gaining attention, and individuals are
increasingly taking advantage of online platforms to participate in both the
creation and consumption of legal sex work. However, one side effect of the
growing opportunities to engage in legal sex work online is the resulting decrease
in anonymity. By working on well-known platforms such as PornHub or
OnlyFans, sex workers increase their risk of being recognized by clients,
coworkers, employers, family, or friends. This decrease in anonymity has led to
an influx of stories detailing the discrimination legal sex workers face in their
“traditional” jobs. While discrimination against sex workers is nothing new, its
increasing visibility raises an important question: Should individuals have to
choose between their sexual autonomy and their ability to obtain—and keep—
their “traditional” employment without fear of discrimination? Further, what
protections exist when an employer takes an adverse employment action against
an individual for their decision to participate in legal sex work outside of their
“traditional” job?
Currently, there is no recognized remedy for sex workers who face employment
discrimination from their non-sex-work employment because of their choice to
participate in legal sex work. However, that remedy should exist under a law
that is already in place: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Historically,
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of sex” has been read very
narrowly to focus on a strict male-versus-female dichotomy that severely limited
its application. Today, however, courts are increasingly willing to expand Title
VII to protect the legal rights that are based on, and extensions of, an individual’s
sex. Given that Title VII’s purpose is to provide for equality in the workplace,
discrimination based on one’s decision to engage in legal sex work appears to be
in line with the very type of discrimination Title VII was intended to prevent.
This Comment argues that Title VII’s definition of sex should either be correctly
interpreted or expanded so that Title VII’s prohibition of employment
discrimination protects employees who choose to engage in legal sex work. The
current narrow interpretation of “because of sex” severely limits its application
and leaves individuals who choose to engage in legal sex work without adequate
protection. Discrimination against an individual for choosing to participate in
sex work is discrimination “because of sex,” and correctly interpreting, or
* © 2022 Lauren Boone.
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expanding, that definition would allow Title VII to better provide the protection
its text guarantees.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 2020, the New York Post published an article titled “NYC
Medic Helped ‘Make Ends Meet’ With Racy OnlyFans Side Gig,”1 which
shared a story about Lauren Kwei, a twenty-three-year-old New York City
paramedic who started an OnlyFans2 account to post explicit photos in order to

1. Dean Balsamini & Susan Edelman, NYC Medic Helped “Make Ends Meet” with Racy OnlyFans
Side Gig, N.Y. POST (Dec. 12, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/12/12/nyc-medic-helpedmake-ends-meet-with-racy-onlyfans-side-gig/ [http://perma.cc/A5C2-ZB7E].
2. See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text for an explanation of OnlyFans and its
connection to sex work.
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support herself during the COVID-19 pandemic.3 The article was published
against her wishes and in an attempt to shame her.4 The story publicized highly
personal information, including details about her current employer, and Kwei
immediately feared the article would put both her job and reputation at risk.5
Surprisingly, social media communities supported Kwei and condemned the
New York Post for doxing someone just for trying to earn extra money to pay
her expenses.6 Kwei advocated for herself and others like her, asserting, “as long
as you’re not hurting anybody or hurting yourself, do what you want. Mind
your business.”7 Further, she pointed out that “this was a really easy way to
capitalize off of men who were going to be looking at porn anyways.”8
While Kwei did not lose her job as a paramedic,9 her story is more of an
exception than the general rule. In February of 2020, Kristen Vaughn was fired
from her job as an auto mechanic after her male coworkers discovered her
OnlyFans account and viewed her pornographic content while at work.10
Similarly, the “list of porn performers blacklisted by their professional
communities reads like an endless scroll.”11 People like Stacie Halas, Julia Pink,
Kevin Hogan, Tera Myers, Shawn Loftis, Gauge, and Belle Knox were all
harassed, fired from their “traditional” jobs, or prevented from even entering
the nonporn workforce because of their past or present engagement in legal sex
work.12 And if employers would not fire employees for viewing pornography,
3. EJ Dickson, Meet the Paramedic Whose OnlyFans Was Outed by the ‘New York Post,’ ROLLING
STONE (Dec. 17, 2020, 2:31 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/onlyfansmedic-lauren-kwei-new-york-post-interview-1104943/ [https://perma.cc/A9UD-DH82].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Otillia Steadman, Her Colleagues Watched Her OnlyFans Account at Work. When Bosses
Found Out, They Fired Her., BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 25, 2020, 12:44 PM), https://www.buzzfeed
news.com/article/otilliasteadman/mechanic-fired-onlyfans-account-indiana [http://perma.cc/9TLL-W
4M5]. While Vaughn took some of her photographs on her employer’s property and in her uniform,
her story nevertheless illustrates the increasing concern over employment discrimination against
legal sex workers. See Emily Jashinsky, How BuzzFeed Botched a Story About an Indiana Mechanic
Fired After Posting Porn from Work, FEDERALIST (Apr. 28, 2020), https://thefederalist.com/2020/
04/28/how-buzzfeed-botched-a-story-about-an-indiana-mechanic-fired-after-posting-porn-from-work
[http://perma.cc/WVU9-YE3Q]. Vaughn’s employer insisted she was fired for violating company
policy, likely related to inappropriate conduct in the workplace. Id. Notably, while Vaughn may have
been appropriately terminated for engaging in legal sex work while at her place of employment, her
male coworkers who found and watched her videos while also on company property and during their
shifts were not punished. Steadman, supra. This appears to be exactly the type of sex discrimination
Title VII sought to prohibit.
11. Isabelle Kohn, Former Porn Stars Explain How Porn Screwed Up Their Lives, ROOSTER (Dec.
12, 2017), https://therooster.com/blog/how-much-does-doing-porn-actually-affect-your-future [http://
perma.cc/FZD9-HQ9V].
12. Id. For a definition of legal sex work, see infra text accompanying notes 31–32.
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why should they punish others for simply providing it? These stories raise an
important question: Should an individual have to choose between their sexual
autonomy and their ability to obtain—and keep—gainful “traditional”
employment without fear of discrimination?
To make matters worse, employment discrimination cases involving sex
workers are very hard to win.13 What protections exist when an employer takes
an adverse employment action against an individual for their decision to
participate in legal sex work outside of their “traditional” employment? As sex
work increasingly moves to online platforms such as PornHub14 and OnlyFans,15
the answer to that question becomes all the more important.
The answer is a difficult one. Currently, there is not a recognized remedy
for legal sex workers who are fired from their non-sex-work employment
because of their participation in legal sex work. However, that remedy should
be available under a law that already exists: Title VII. While Title VII is meant
to protect women and minorities against workplace discrimination, Title VII’s
prohibition of discrimination “because of sex” is read very narrowly16 and does
not cover legal, logical extensions of an individual’s sex.17 However,
discrimination based on an individual’s decision to engage in legal sex work
appears to be in line with the very type of discrimination Congress aimed to

13. Kohn, supra note 11.
14. Pornhub is one of the largest pornography sites in the world, where official content partners
or members of its model program can upload content for others to view, either for free or through paid
accounts. Samantha Cole, Pornhub Just Purged All Unverified Content from the Platform, VICE (Dec. 14,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgqjjy/pornhub-suspended-all-unverified-videoscontent [https://perma.cc/9QW5-7J89]. In 2019, the site hosted 115 million users per day. Curtis Silver,
Pornhub 2019 Year in Review Report: More Porn, More Often, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2019, 10:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/curtissilver/2019/12/11/pornhub-2019-year-in-review-report-more-porn
-more-often/?sh=6521cb464671 [https://perma.cc/XE78-JTN4 (dark archive)].
15. See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text. Notably, on August 19, 2021, OnlyFans
announced that they would begin to “prohibit the posting of any content containing sexually explicit
conduct” in October 2021 upon “the requests of [their] banking partners and payout providers.” Tina
Horn, OnlyFans May Have Rescinded Their Sexual Content Ban, But Sex Workers Remain Skeptical,
ROLLING STONE (Aug. 25, 2021, 10:50 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/
onlyfans-explicit-content-ban-response-1216466/ [https://perma.cc/AZ3R-JY5H] (quoting OnlyFans’
August 19, 2021, statement). A week later, the company rescinded the policy after facing immense
backlash, including claims of hypocrisy—after all, the platform built its reputation on the adult content
it provides and gained notoriety and financial success through such content. Id. Despite OnlyFans’
decision to abandon its proposed policy change, the legal sex workers who use the platform face
uncertainty yet again, explaining that OnlyFans “is just another example in a long, long line of websites
building their entire brands on [sex workers’ labor, bodies, and influence], and then turning their backs
on [sex workers] as soon as it might benefit them financially.” Id. (quoting Lydia Caradonna, a sex
worker and founding member of Decrim Now, a group that campaigns for the decriminalization of sex
work in the United Kingdom). This further emphasizes the increasing need for protections for sex
workers.
16. See infra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Section IV.A.
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prevent.18 And while Title VII does provide some limited protections for
employees supplementing their income through engaging in legal sex work,19 by
applying its narrow definition of “because of sex,” courts fail to provide these
individuals with the protection against employment discrimination that the Act
guarantees. This Comment argues that Title VII’s definition of sex should
either be correctly interpreted or expanded so that Title VII’s central
prohibition of employment discrimination protects an employee’s engagement
in legal sex work.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on legal sex
work. Part II provides an overview of Title VII and the different frameworks
courts apply to Title VII claims. Additionally, it demonstrates the ways in
which Title VII jurisprudence has evolved since the Act’s passage. Part III
illustrates potential protections currently available for legal sex workers under
Title VII. However, these available protections contain gaps and limitations
that largely preclude them from offering legal sex workers any real safeguards
against employment discrimination. As such, Part IV argues that discrimination
against legal sex workers is discrimination “because of sex,” which is forbidden
by Title VII. The purpose of Title VII, the scant legislative history, and recent
Supreme Court decisions all support a broader definition of “because of sex”
that would provide individuals with protection from employment
discrimination based on their decision to engage in legal sex work. Additionally,
Part IV illustrates the impact a broadened definition of sex that includes legal
sex work would have on Title VII sex discrimination claims and addresses the
implications of such a shift. While this Comment seeks to demonstrate that sex
work is already included under Title VII, and thus an act of Congress is not
needed to confirm this, Part IV also outlines two alternative solutions to provide
legal sex workers with the protection Title VII guarantees. In sum, this
Comment argues that individuals like Lauren Kwei should not have to choose
between their legal right to engage in sex work and their right to employment
free from sex discrimination.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL SEX WORK
The term “sex work” describes commercial sex, or “the provision of sexual
services for money or goods.”20 Activist Carol Leigh coined the term in 1978 to
describe a wide range of activities, both legal and illegal, including prostitution,
18. See infra Section IV.A.
19. See infra Part III.
20. CHERYL OVERS, SEX WORKERS: PART OF THE SOLUTION 2 (2002), https://www.who.int/
hiv/topics/vct/sw_toolkit/115solution.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PRM-F78H]; see also Understanding
Sex Work in an Open Society, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explain
ers/understanding-sex-work-open-society [https://perma.cc/2J87-35QZ] (Apr. 2019) [hereinafter
Understanding Sex Work].
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pornography, phone sex, webcam modeling, stripping, and other forms of exotic
labor and performances.21 Individuals engage in sex work for a variety of
reasons: some believe it is the best option they have to make ends meet, some
do so for the high pay and flexible working conditions, and others do so to
“explore and express their sexuality.”22 Critics of sex work argue that it is
immoral, illegal, and unworthy of any form of protection, whether through the
law or through social support for the individuals involved in the sex work
industry.23 While the morality of sex work has long been debated,24 advocates
for the decriminalization of sex work counter critics’ arguments by emphasizing
that engaging in legal sex work is a choice that can provide economic
empowerment,25 and that the criminalization of sex work further endangers “sex
workers’ health and safety by driving sex work underground.”26 Evidence
demonstrates that laws criminalizing consensual sex work “often make sex
workers less safe and provide impunity for abusers with sex workers often too
scared of being penalized to report crime to the police.”27 Furthermore,
consensual or legal sex work is often conflated with illegal sex trafficking, child
sex abuse, and rape.28 While there is some overlap, equating legal sex work with
human rights violations is dangerous. Not only does it lead to the further
stigmatization of sex workers, but it also precludes them from receiving legal
protections guaranteed to the rest of society.
21. Mattilda Bernstein Sycamore, ‘Sex Workers Unite,’ by Melinda Chateauvert, SFGATE (Jan.
10, 2014), https://www.sfgate.com/books/article/Sex-Workers-Unite-by-Melinda-Chateauvert-513250
3.php [https://perma.cc/F76S-T7XK].
22. Understanding Sex Work, supra note 20.
23. Chris Herlinger, The Worldwide Debate About Sex Work: Morality Meets Reality, GLOB.
SISTERS REP. (July 27, 2017), https://www.globalsistersreport.org/news/trafficking/worldwidedebate-about-sex-work-morality-meets-reality-48216 [https://perma.cc/X5DA-CBYQ].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Understanding Sex Work, supra note 20.
27. Amnesty International Publishes Policy and Research on Protection of Sex Workers’ Rights, AMNESTY
INT’L (May 26, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/amnestyinternational-publishes-policy-and-research-on-protection-of-sex-workers-rights/ [https://perma.cc/F
K4K-6Z34].
28. Jasmine Garsd, Should Sex Work Be Decriminalized? Some Activists Say It’s Time, NPR (Mar.
22, 2019, 2:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/22/705354179/should-sex-work-be-decriminalizedsome-activists-say-its-time [https://perma.cc/NAL5-ZJTX] (“The debate about sex and sex work
always gets linked to trafficking.”); Ravishly, Is Sex Work Empowering or Enslaving? 12 Experts Weigh In,
HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/is-sex-work-empowering-or-enslaving_b_5825882 [http
://perma.cc/4CF5-D4M2] (Dec. 6, 2017). There is sometimes overlap between consensual sex work
and illegal sex trafficking because some sex workers do experience sex trafficking. See YALE GLOB.
HEALTH JUST. P’SHIP, SEX WORK VS SEX TRAFFICKING: HOW THEY ARE DIFFERENT AND WHY
IT MATTERS *1–2 (2020), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/issue
_brief_sex_work_vs_trafficking_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVX7-NX6U] (describing the importance of
keeping sex work and sex trafficking analytically distinct and explaining the implications of maintaining
that boundary). However, not all sex workers are trafficked, and as such, this conflation does not
accurately reflect the reality of sex work. Id.
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While scholars and activists disagree over what exactly is included in the
term “sex work,”29 many of the individuals who engage in such work see this
term as less “demeaning and stigmatizing” and prefer it over the term
“prostitution,” which implies criminality or immorality.30 Thus, this Comment
divides sex work into two distinct categories: legal and illegal. Legal sex work
involves a consensual transaction between adults that does not violate human
rights or existing laws, including webcamming, phone sex, stripping, and
pornography.31 It is a logical extension, or expression, of an individual’s
sexuality that can provide individuals with “an arena of sexual freedom where
[an individual] is encouraged to explore [their] sexuality without shame or
stigma.”32 Illegal sex work, on the other hand, involves sexual transactions that
violate human rights or existing laws, including prostitution33 and
nonconsensual acts such as child pornography, human trafficking, revenge
pornography, or rape.34 Focusing on legal and consensual sex work precludes its
conflation35 with illegal sex work, which can be harmful and dangerous to the
individuals involved, and highlights the fact that legal sex work is a choice that
deserves protection.
Individuals who have engaged, or currently engage, in sex work face
“exclusion from health, legal, and social services,”36 all while confronting
discrimination in numerous contexts. This Comment argues Title VII should
be correctly interpreted to include protection against employment
discrimination for legal sex workers, not sex work in general. Such a distinction
precludes employers’ arguments that they are prohibiting illegal conduct as a
basis for adverse employment decisions rather than because of sex
discrimination. Existing gender stereotypes “explain why women and
29. See Andrew Poitras, What Constitutes Sex Work?, HOPES & FEARS, http://www.hopes
andfears.com/hopes/now/question/216863-what-constitutes-sex-work [https://perma.cc/LL5H-ZAG
T].
30. Understanding Sex Work, supra note 20.
31. Id.
32. Alissa C. Perrucci, The Transformative Power of Sex Work, 24 HUMAN. & SOC’Y 323, 325
(2000).
33. While prostitution is currently illegal in most of the United States, movements arguing for
the decriminalization of prostitution have been gaining traction and attention. The decriminalization
of sex work “means removal of criminal and administrative penalties that apply specifically to sex work,
creating an enabling environment for sex worker health and safety.” Understanding Sex Work, supra note
20; see also Anna North, The Movement To Decriminalize Sex Work, Explained, VOX (Aug. 2, 2019, 7:30
AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/8/2/20692327/sex-work-decriminalization-prostitution-new-yorkdc [https://perma.cc/JJ2E-MLJH]. Other countries have removed criminal penalties for prostitution,
and in 2016 Amnesty International called for the global decriminalization of sex work. Id.
34. Ravishly, supra note 28. Additionally, it is important to note that although sex work and sex
trafficking are often treated as one and the same, the conflation of the two activities is “harmful and
counterproductive.” Understanding Sex Work, supra note 20. For purposes of this Comment, they will
be treated separately.
35. See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text.
36. Understanding Sex Work, supra note 20.
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minorities are more likely to suffer harm in the job market,” and reflect the fact
that discrimination against individuals who engage in sex work stems not from
valid concerns but from society’s judgment that such behavior is immoral.37
Thus, when employers discriminate against an individual based on their choice
to engage in legal sex work, such discrimination is in line with the very
discrimination Title VII was passed to protect against.38
Due to the “digital revolution,” sex work is increasingly transitioning from
the streets and strip clubs to online platforms.39 In 2018, the online porn
industry was estimated to have earned annual revenues as high as $97 billion;
this number is staggering, especially when compared with the earnings of
corporate heavy hitters like Netflix, which earned an estimated $11.7 billion in
the same timeframe.40 Notably, MindGeek, “the largest adult entertainment
operator globally,” owns and operates some of the largest porn sites on the
internet, including PornHub, Brazzers, RedTube, YouPorn, and numerous
others.41 Currently, MindGeek generates more internet traffic and is
responsible for more bandwidth consumption than Amazon, Facebook, or
Twitter, and closely trails Google and Netflix.42 On its own, PornHub draws
over 120 million visitors each day and around 3.5 billion users each month.43 As
of December 2020, PornHub alone boasts a net worth of $1.5 billion.44
This shift to online platforms has been exacerbated by COVID-19, and
the platform OnlyFans has emerged as an industry giant that enables creators,
who are largely women, to provide subscription access to pornographic content
to users, who are largely men.45 Subscribers, or “fans,” pay a fee ranging from
37. Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1928 (2019).
38. See infra Section IV.A.
39. Louise Perry, How OnlyFans Became the Porn Industry’s Great Lockdown Winner—and at What
Cost, NEW STATESMAN, https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/social-media/2020/11/howonlyfans-became-porn-industry-s-great-lockdown-winner-and-what [https://perma.cc/F4MQ-DES9]
(July 1, 2021, 12:14 PM).
40. Aisha Hassan, Porn Sites Collect More User Data Than Netflix or Hulu. This Is What They Do
with It, QUARTZ, https://qz.com/1407235/porn-sites-collect-more-user-data-than-netflix-or-hulu-thisis-what-they-do-with-it/ [https://perma.cc/68D6-SSGZ] (Dec. 26, 2018).
41. Smita M, Who Owns Pornhub’s Parent Company MindGeek? Net Worth and Everything About
Montreal Pornography Conglomerate, MEAWW, https://meaww.com/porn-hub-parent-company-mindgeek-net-worth-everything-about-montreal-based-pornography-conglomerate [https://perma.cc/C5G
W-9NLZ] (Dec. 16, 2020, 4:10 PM).
42. Id.
43. Id. Comparatively, Twitter has 192 million daily active users. Ying Lin, 10 Twitter Statistics
Every Marketer Should Know in 2021 [Infographic], OBERLO (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.oberlo.com/
blog/twitter-statistics#:~:text=There%20are%20330%20million%20monthly,daily%20active%20users%
20on%20Twitter [https://perma.cc/J9BC-5FQU].
44. M, supra note 41.
45. Perry, supra note 39; see also Jacob Bernstein, How OnlyFans Changed Sex Work Forever, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/style/onlyfans-porn-stars.html [https://
www.perma.cc//B682-C7MQ (dark archive)] (describing the implications of the way OnlyFans “put
X-rated entertainment in the hands of its entertainers”).
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five to fifty dollars per month, and are allowed to “tip” the creator for
personalized content.46 As COVID-19 stay-at-home orders went into effect in
March 2020, OnlyFans reported 3.5 million new sign-ups, or roughly 150,000
new users every twenty-four hours.47 The total number of “fans” surged from
twenty million users in February 202048 to roughly ninety million by December
2020,49 and from 120,000 creators in 2019 to over one million as of December
2020, the majority of whom post some form of explicit content.50 Such a surge
in content creators was likely due to a combination of “loneliness, boredom and
a need for extra cash,”51 as COVID-19 restrictions forced those already engaged
in sex work to shift their businesses online, and caused others to lose their jobs
and look for additional ways to make ends meet.52 And OnlyFans is not the only
platform of its kind—there are numerous similar platforms that have either
launched or increased in popularity in response to COVID-19.53 This
demonstrates that not only are more people participating in both the creation
and consumption of legal sex work, but more spaces are becoming available
where individuals can choose to engage in legal sex work.
Although more convenient, this shift to online platforms is creating
additional problems for sex workers.54 One notable issue is the increased

46. What Is OnlyFans and How Has This Site Changed the Adult Industry?, FIGHT NEW DRUG (Aug.
27, 2020), https://fightthenewdrug.org/what-is-onlyfans-and-how-has-this-site-changed-the-adultindustry/ [https://www.perma.cc/3VVE-3XAC] [hereinafter What Is OnlyFans?].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Gillian Friedman, Jobless, Selling Nudes Online and Still Struggling, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/business/onlyfans-pandemic-users.html?action=click&module=
News&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/DTP9-H9SF (dark archive)] (Oct. 21, 2021).
50. Id. Congress has defined “sexually explicit conduct” as “actual or simulated” sexual
intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or “lascivious exhibition of the anus,
genitals, or pubic area of any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A). However, content shared on OnlyFans
is not limited to sexually explicit conduct; other creators, including celebrities and influencers, use
OnlyFans to promote new music, connect with fans, and give followers an inside look at their everyday
lives. See Joshua Espinoza, OnlyFans Explained: What You Need To Know About the NSFW Site,
COMPLEX (Sept. 20, 2021), https://www.complex.com/life/what-is-onlyfans-explainer [https://perma.
cc/D34U-KEP6]. For example, the tourism board for Vienna, Austria, has created an OnlyFans account
in an effort to share artwork depicting nudity and to protest other online platforms’ censorship of such
works. See Elle Hunt, Vienna Museums Open Adult-Only OnlyFans Account To Display Nudes, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 16, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2021/oct/16/vienna-museumsopen-adult-only-onlyfans-account-to-display-nudes [https://perma.cc/77YV-ZASC].
51. What Is OnlyFans?, supra note 46.
52. Id.
53. See 10 Best OnlyFans Alternatives To Make Money in 2021, CAM MODEL AGENCY,
https://cammodelagency.com/onlyfans-alternative/ [https://perma.cc/2L5U-D5CK].
54. For an explanation of “[s]ome of the risks OnlyFans poses to individuals, relationships, and
society,” see What Is OnlyFans?, supra note 46.
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visibility and decreased anonymity.55 As more sex workers move to well-known
online platforms, they increase the likelihood of being recognized by clients,
employers, coworkers, family, and friends. On sites like PornHub or OnlyFans,
many explicit content creators post under fake names, locations, and handles or
screen names, or hide their faces in an attempt to remain anonymous.56
However, as Lauren Kwei and many other cases57 illustrate, remaining
anonymous in today’s digital world is not always possible,58 and content creators
face the danger that their choice to engage in legal sex work will adversely
impact their daily lives and ability to obtain and keep more “traditional”
employment. And as this shift towards the internet will continue to increase, it
is becoming even more important that Title VII is interpreted in a way that
provides the level of protection its statutory text guarantees for all law-abiding
workers. Only then can Title VII ensure that legal sex workers are not
discriminated against based on their legal choice and right to express their
sexuality by participating in legal sex work.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 196459 for the purpose
of “improv[ing] the economic and social conditions of minorities and women
by providing equality of opportunity.”60 Further, Congress clarified that
“[t]hese conditions were part of a larger pattern of restriction, exclusion,
discrimination, segregation, and inferior treatment of minorities and women in
many areas of life.”61 Title VII defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any
agent of such a person” and includes exceptions for some government entities.62
Thus, Title VII’s central prohibition establishes:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
55. See Sofia Barrett-Ibarria, Here’s How Much It Really Costs To Be an Online Sex Worker,
HUFFPOST (Apr. 13, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/online-sex-work-cam-onlyfans-covid-19_n_5e8de205c5b6359f96d0c2d4 [https://perma.cc/H852-39FP].
56. What Is OnlyFans?, supra note 46.
57. See Kohn, supra note 11.
58. See Dickson, supra note 3.
59. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(b) (2021).
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
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would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.63
The statute further provides an important exception for employment practices
that draw distinctions “on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise.”64 Thus, unless such a “bona fide occupational
qualification” exists, employers are not permitted to make employment
decisions on the basis of an individual’s sex.
However, “sex” was only included as a protected classification in the
statute at the last moment, when Virginia Congressman Howard W. Smith
proposed adding “sex” as a class in what many commentators believe was an
effort to prevent Title VII from being enacted.65 This effort was unsuccessful,
and after only a few additional hours of discussion, Title VII passed in the
House by a vote of 168–133 with the amendment adding “sex” as one of the five
protected classes.66 This late addition of “sex” as a protected class had two
important implications for the analysis of Title VII sex discrimination claims.
First, “[i]t is a commonplace in employment discrimination law that Title VII’s
prohibition of sex discrimination has no legislative history.”67 Second, “sex” was
left undefined by the statute.68 As a result, courts have little guidance from
either legislative history or statutory text when interpreting what falls within
the classification of “sex.” This, in turn, resulted in courts historically applying
a narrow, “traditional concept” of sex—which “divide[s] men and women into
two perfectly sex-differentiated groups”69—to conclude that many claims fell
outside the statute’s scope.70 But as society’s views towards “sex” continue to

63. Id. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
64. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
65. Teresa Shulda, Does Discrimination “Because of Sex” Cover Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Discrimination?: The Evolution of Title VII, 87 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N 54, 55 (2018); Cary Franklin, Inventing
the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1318 (2012).
66. 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964).
67. Franklin, supra note 65, at 1317.
68. § 2000e. This section defines many of the statute’s terms. See, e.g., § 2000e(a) (“person”);
§ 2000e(b) (“employer”); § 2000e(f) (“employee”); § 2000e(g) (“commerce”); § 2000(j) (“religion”).
Notably, the terms “sex” and “discrimination” were left out of the definitions. The phrases “because of
sex” or “on the basis of sex” were defined with the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, which amended Title VII by adding § 2000e(k). Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
69. See Franklin, supra note 65, at 1308. Franklin asserts Title VII was initially constrained to
protect “traditional gender norms and sexual conventions,” and to preserve and regulate “men’s and
women’s sex and family roles.” Id. at 1325, 1380.
70. See id. at 1319.
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change and the “traditional concept” of sex becomes more archaic,71 it appears
that a more dynamic method of interpreting “sex” under Title VII is in line
with the statute’s stated purpose.72
A.

Title VII Sex Discrimination

To protect women and minorities against employment discrimination,
Title VII provides two distinct types of employment protections: prohibition
against status-based discrimination of protected classes, which includes both
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories,73 and prohibition against
retaliation.74 However, even these broad categories of protections leave much
room for improvement when applied in cases involving discrimination “because
of sex.” While the focus of this Comment is on disparate treatment claims,
understanding how these Title VII protections work together highlights the
Act’s shortcomings in providing legal sex workers with any real safeguards.
1. Disparate Treatment Claims
Disparate treatment claims occur when an employer “treat[s a] particular
person less favorably than others because of” a protected trait and requires that
the employee, as plaintiff, prove that the employer, as defendant, took an
adverse employment action because of “a discriminatory intent or motive.”75
The Supreme Court established a framework for analyzing disparate treatment
claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.76 For a disparate treatment claim,
71. Id. at 1377–78. Extending “protections to gay and transgender workers is the result of
developments not in formal logic, but in social logic; courts . . . are beginning to develop new
understandings of the ways in which discrimination against sexual minorities can reflect and reinforce
gendered conceptions of sex and family roles.” Id. This reflects that as society’s views about gender,
gender roles, and sex shift, so do courts’ normative judgments regarding “how far the law should go in
disrupting the enforcement of gender norms in the workplace.” Id. at 1333. Social norms historically
shaped Title VII jurisprudence, and “socially inflected judgments continue to determine the law’s
parameters today.” Id. at 1373; see also Marc Chase McAllister, Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a
Form of Sex-Plus Discrimination, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1007, 1008–09 (2019) (stating that “[t]imes, and
judicial interpretations [of Title VII], are changing” as courts expand sex discrimination to include
sexual orientation).
72. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
73. § 2000e-2; Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). Originally, Title VII only prohibited
disparate treatment and did not expressly apply to disparate impact theories of discrimination. Ricci,
557 U.S. at 577. However, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court interpreted Title
VII to include a disparate impact theory. Id. at 430–31. This was further solidified with the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which added a provision to Title VII prohibiting disparate impact
discrimination. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
74. § 2000e-3(a). See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347–52 (2013)
(describing the scope of Title VII).
75. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988); § 2000e-2(a)(1).
76. 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). In this case, an African American civil rights activist protested
when he was laid off, arguing that his discharge and his employer’s hiring practices were racially
motivated. Id. at 794. He reapplied for the position but was rejected because of his involvement in the
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courts employ the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test: (1) the plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on a protected class,
after which (2) the employer must “articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions, and (3) the plaintiff must then show
that discrimination occurred.77 In order to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the employee is a member of a
protected class; (2) the employer knew of the employee’s protected class; (3)
the employer took adverse action against the employee; and (4) others outside
of the protected class who are similarly situated were not subject to the same
adverse treatment or were treated more favorably.78
Under the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff must
ultimately show that discrimination occurred. This is typically done by
providing evidence demonstrating that the employer’s proffered reason for its
allegedly discriminatory action is merely pretext.79 A plaintiff’s evidence of
pretext can include the employer’s previous treatment of the employee during
their term of employment, the employer’s “general policy and practice with
respect to minority employment,” or the employer’s favorable treatment of
similarly situated employees outside of the plaintiff’s protected group.80 Thus,
if an employment practice or policy treats male and female employees in the
same role differently, then that could illustrate that the employer’s proffered
reasons for its actions were merely pretext for gender discrimination. Claims
for sexual harassment81 and gender stereotyping are included under this
disparate treatment theory.82
Further, there are two possible ways to prove the employer engaged in
intentional discrimination under the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test:
by showing “but-for” causation or by using a “mixed-motive” analysis. The
protests. Id. at 796. The employee then filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and ultimately brought a Title VII suit. Id. at 796–97.
77. Id. at 802–04.
78. Id. at 802. The elements for proving a prima facie case of discrimination “will vary in Title
VII cases” depending on the “differing factual situations.” Id. at 802 n.13. The McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework “was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). Instead, the elements required will vary in cases involving
hiring, promotion, discharge, and other factual scenarios. See id.
79. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804. An employer will not automatically face liability
under Title VII if the employee merely proves pretext. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 148 (2000). The employee must ultimately present evidence that discrimination did in fact
occur. Id.
80. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804–05.
81. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (recognizing that sexual
harassment that creates an abusive or hostile working environment is a cognizable claim under Title
VII); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (recognizing Title VII extends
to same-sex sexual harassment).
82. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
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“but-for” analysis first assumes a factor, such as gender, was present at the time
of the employment decision, and then considers whether the decision would
have been the same even if that factor was absent.83 Thus, a plaintiff in a
disparate treatment case can succeed when they demonstrate that, but-for their
gender, the employer’s decision would have been different. Under a “mixedmotive” analysis, the plaintiff must show that intentional discrimination was a
motivating factor for the employer’s adverse action. The employer then has an
opportunity for an affirmative defense: the employer would have made the same
adverse action even absent their unlawful motivation to discriminate based on
a protected class.84 Thus, where a plaintiff can show that its employer’s decision
was motivated in part by an illegitimate and unlawful reason, such as gender,
they can succeed in demonstrating disparate treatment.85 However, unlike the
but-for analysis, the mixed-motive analysis allows the employer to affirmatively
assert that they would have made the same decision even in the absence of this
discriminatory reason.
2. Disparate Impact Claims
Conversely, a disparate impact claim covers facially neutral employment
practices that cause a disparate impact on the basis of a protected class and does
not require that plaintiffs prove discriminatory intent.86 Title VII establishes a
similar burden-shifting framework for disparate impact cases: (1) the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the employer has a facially neutral practice or policy that
has a disparate impact on a protected class; (2) after a discriminatory effect is
shown, the employer “may defend against liability by demonstrating that the
practice is ‘job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity;’” and (3) if the employer meets that burden, the plaintiff must show
that “the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment
practice that has less disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate
needs.”87

83. Id. at 240.
84. Id. at 252.
85. Id. at 258.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (explaining
that disparate impact claims apply to “practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a
disproportionately adverse effect on minorities”).
87. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578 (quoting § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)). While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did
not originally include an express prohibition against disparate impact, the Supreme Court first
interpreted the Act to prohibit policies that created a disparate impact in Griggs. 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 later codified this prohibition against disparate impact
discrimination and the burden-shifting framework used in analyzing such cases. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577–
78.
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3. Retaliation Claims
Finally, Title VII provides for a cause of action for retaliation. Title VII
establishes that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against a potential or existing employee because that individual
“has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice . . . or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII.88 To demonstrate
a prima facie case of retaliation, (1) the plaintiff must have engaged in a
protected activity, including either participation in a Title VII investigation,
proceeding, or hearing, or opposition to unlawful employment practices; (2) the
employer must have imposed an adverse employment action; and (3) the
plaintiff’s protected activity must have been a but-for cause of the alleged
adverse action.89
B.

The Evolution of Title VII Sex Discrimination

Early cases applied a strict and narrow definition of what qualified as
impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII, finding violations only where
“the offensive conduct . . . perfectly and clearly differentiate[d] between all
women and all men.”90 For example, in General Electric Company v. Gilbert,91 the
Supreme Court held that an employer’s disability benefits plan that did not
cover pregnancy-related disabilities did not violate Title VII.92 The Court
reasoned that despite the fact that pregnancy-related disabilities impacted
women more than men, the scheme did not have a gender-based discriminatory
effect because the plan provided equally for men and women alike.93 Similarly,
courts relied on this men-versus-women distinction to determine that Title VII
did not preclude no-marriage employment rules,94 policies excluding working
mothers,95 and workplace sexual harassment.96 As a result, for roughly the first
88. § 2000e-3(a).
89. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).
90. Shulda, supra note 65, at 56.
91. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
92. Id. at 145–46.
93. Id. at 138–40.
94. Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 783 (E.D. La. 1967) (holding that the
airline’s requirement that female stewardesses be unmarried did not violate Title VII); Stroud v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., No. 76-2130, 1977 WL 25929, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 1977) (unpublished table decision)
(same).
95. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 4–5 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated, 400 U.S. 542
(1971) (finding the company’s policy prohibiting mothers, but not fathers, of preschool-aged children
from employment in certain positions did not violate Title VII).
96. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163–64 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d
55 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision) (holding that sexual harassment by supervisor was not
prohibited by Title VII).
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decade after Title VII’s enactment, the meaning of sex was severely limited in
its application and relied on “traditional concepts” of sex, generally in terms of
a binary distinction between men and women. As such, claims of sex
discrimination were similarly limited to only protecting against discrimination
that treated the general class of women differently from that of men.
However, over time, Congress, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), and the courts began to expand Title VII and apply
sex discrimination to a wider range of conduct. In 1978, Congress amended
Title VII by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,97 which expressly
provides that the prohibition against sex discrimination includes discrimination
based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.98 Notably, this
amendment provides that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions.”99 This language is significant in that the phrase
“not limited to” recognizes the possibility of future expansions of Title VII’s
definition of sex discrimination. Further, the text makes it clear that women
cannot be treated differently for employment purposes based on their
pregnancy status.100 Becoming pregnant is not only a legal right, but it is also a
choice, as not all women become pregnant. And that choice—whether or not to
become pregnant—is inextricably linked to an individual’s sex. The expansion
of Title VII to include discrimination based on a woman’s choice to become
pregnant recognizes the possibility that in the future, interpretation of Title VII
could further expand to include other legal expressions of an individual’s sex.
Later court opinions further established that Title VII prohibited the
previously permissible no-marriage rules,101 policies barring working mothers,102
and workplace sexual harassment.103 Similarly, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,104
the Supreme Court held that gender stereotyping can qualify as prohibited sex

97. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
98. § 2000e(k).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. (“Women affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”).
101. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding that the airline’s
no-marriage policy for female stewardesses violated Title VII).
102. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (remanding to the district court
to determine whether the employer could establish “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise” to support the policy
prohibiting mothers of preschool-aged children from holding certain positions, which would preclude
Title VII liability).
103. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that “hostile environment”
sexual harassment is a cognizable Title VII claim).
104. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071.
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discrimination under Title VII.105 And in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.,106 the Court held that Title VII’s prohibitions against workplace sexual
harassment extended to same-sex sexual harassment.107
A recent Title VII case further expanded the scope of what constitutes sex,
looking beyond the “traditional concepts” of sex to include both sexual
orientation and gender identity. In Bostock v. Clayton County,108 the Supreme
Court considered “whether an employer can fire someone simply for being
homosexual or transgender.”109 The Court explained that Title VII’s language
prohibiting discrimination “because of” sex110 includes but-for causation and the
mixed-motives analysis.111 Thus, even where other factors contributed to an
employer’s decision, as long as the employee’s sex was one but-for cause, Title
VII applies.112 Therefore, the Court held that “an employer who intentionally
treats a person worse because of sex . . . discriminates against that person in
violation of Title VII.”113 Further, the Court clarified that “if changing the
employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—a
statutory violation has occurred.”114 The Court found that Title VII’s definition
of “because of sex” was more broadly applicable than past precedent provided.
It does not just protect gender classes as a group; it also protects against
discrimination based on a particular individual’s sexual identity.
These decisions demonstrate courts’ increasing willingness to expand Title
VII to protect legal extensions of an individual’s sex. They protect an
individual’s legal right to get married, to be a working parent, and to work free
from sexual harassment. Additionally, these decisions protect an individual’s
right to express themselves in ways that do not fit neatly into society’s defined
gender stereotypes and categories.115 Finally, these legal rights are extensions of
an individual’s sex in that they go beyond the mere classification of male or
female and involve additional elements that are related to, but not confined to,
biological sex.116 As such, courts are moving away from the strict male-versus105. See id. at 251; see also infra notes 157–60 and accompanying text.
106. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
107. Id. at 79–80; see infra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
108. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
109. Id. at 1737.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
111. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1740.
114. Id. at 1741.
115. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
116. Sex and Gender Identity, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/
learn/gender-identity/sex-gender-identity [https://perma.cc/26XQ-BJQ8] (describing the differences
between biological sex, gender, and gender identity).
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female dichotomy for Title VII’s definition of “sex” and towards a more
dynamic interpretation of “sex” to include the protection of legal rights that are
closely related extensions of the individual’s sex.
III. CURRENT TITLE VII PROTECTIONS FOR LEGAL SEX WORKERS
Title VII, as it is currently interpreted, may provide legal sex workers with
limited protections under existing theories of disparate impact, sexual
harassment, and retaliation. Unfortunately, though, these protections often
contain significant gaps because they provide unequal protection for male and
female sex workers and operate only after unlawful acts have occurred, instead
of requiring employers to establish policies and practices that prevent
discriminatory practices from the beginning. As a result of these limitations, sex
workers are often left largely unprotected.
A.

Potential Disparate Impact Protection

Under the burden-shifting framework for disparate impact claims,117
consider a facially neutral company practice or policy against employing current
or former legal sex workers that applies equally to both male and female
employees. A plaintiff would first need to demonstrate that a policy has a
disparate impact based on sex. The Supreme Court has held that statistical proof
on its own can be sufficient to demonstrate that a practice or policy creates a
disparate impact.118 In such cases, the “proper comparison [is] between the . . .
composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the . . . composition of the qualified . . .
population in the relevant labor market.”119 While statistical data on legal sex
workers is sparse,120 the majority of sex workers are women, with some studies
suggesting that women make up over eighty percent of the sex worker
population.121 As such, it may be possible for a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
policy has a disparate impact based on sex by using statistical data. Importantly,
117. See supra Section II.A.2.
118. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 307–08 (1977)); Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339–40 (1977)
(“We have repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof . . . to establish a prima facie case . . . in
proving employment discrimination. We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable . . . . [T]heir
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.”).
119. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 308.
120. Garsd, supra note 28.
121. See Justin Lehmiller, Nearly One in Five Sex Workers Are Men, VICE (Feb. 21, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/evm5vw/nearly-one-in-five-sex-workers-are-men [https://perma.cc/
N7XL-MY58] (estimating up to twenty percent of sex workers worldwide are men); Timothy BancroftHinchey, Scelles Foundation: 42 Million People Worldwide Are Prostitutes, PRAVDA.RU (Jan. 28,
2014, 7:37 PM), https://english.pravda.ru/society/126700-prostitutes/ [https://perma.cc/F76S-T7XK]
(estimating that “42 million people prostitute themselves in the world today, [and] the vast majority
(75%) of [them are] women between 13 and 25 years [old]”).
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the EEOC has adopted an eighty percent rule of thumb, whereby disparate
impact “is normally indicated when one selection rate [in employment
decisions] is less than 80% of the other.”122 A second part of this analysis is
determining what “the relevant labor market” is for comparison, which adds
another layer of difficulty to the already sparse data that currently exists for sex
workers. The burden would then shift to the employer to prove that the policy
is related and necessary for the job at issue. Such a demonstration would vary
based on the position in question, but could include arguments based on
morality, trustworthiness, or negative reflections on the employer.123 However,
unless the employer can show the policy is job-related and consistent with a
business necessity, and not just a preference, these defenses will fail.124 Because
the majority of sex workers are women, under the “traditional” definition of sex,
female sex workers might be able to demonstrate that they are treated
differently than men in their relevant labor market. Consequently, one
limitation of this approach is that it only protects female, and not male, sex
workers.
B.

Potential Harassment Protection

Similarly, Title VII may protect an individual who faces sexual harassment
at work because of their involvement in legal sex work. Sexual harassment
claims generally require a showing that: (1) the conduct at issue is because of
the plaintiff’s sex; (2) the harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter
the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment’”; (3) the behavior is “unwelcome”; and (4) there is a basis for
employer liability.125 An employer’s liability depends on “the harasser’s status—
as the victim’s supervisor or co-worker—and whether the harasser’s actionable
harassment also culminated in a ‘tangible employment action.’”126 When an
employee is harassed at work after their coworkers learn they are engaged in
122. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 6570-06-M, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO
CLARIFY AND PROVIDE A COMMON INTERPRETATION OF THE UNIFORM GUIDELINES ON
EMPLOYMENT SELECTION PROCEDURES (1979).
123. The Bostock dissent argued against reading Title VII to include sexual orientation and
transgender status because when Title VII was enacted, society believed that “homosexual conduct
was . . . morally culpable and worthy of punishment.” Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731,
1769–72 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito highlighted religious organizations and schools and
warned that the Court’s decision “may undermine the school’s ‘moral teaching’” and allow teachers to
file Title VII claims despite the employer’s morality argument. Id. at 1781.
124. See generally Derek J. Demeri, Note, Who Needs Legislators? Discrimination Against Sex Workers
Is Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 72 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 247 (2019) (providing a more detailed
examination of Title VII’s disparate impact theory as applied to sex work).
125. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67–69 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982)).
126. CHRISTINE J. BACK & WILSON C. FREEMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45155, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AND TITLE VII: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 8 (2018).
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legal sex work, the employee will be protected under Title VII if the employee
can demonstrate that the sexual harassment because of his or her sex was
“sufficiently severe or pervasive,” unwanted, and that there is a basis for the
employer’s liability. Again, “sex” here is typically read under the limited
definition of male-versus-female, thus limiting the scope of this protection.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs pursuing sexual harassment claims under Title VII
have had some success. For example, in Samuels v. Two Farms, Inc.,127 the district
court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and held that the
plaintiff, an exotic dancer, was able to set forth a prima facie case for sexual
harassment under both the quid pro quo128 and hostile environment theories.129
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant, where she was responsible for
working at his store’s cash register and deli.130 The defendant began making
unwanted comments and advances towards her, and when she asked him to
leave her alone, he “drastically” reduced her working hours.131 As a result, she
began working as an exotic dancer to make up for this lost income.132 Once the
defendant found out about her part-time job, the harassment became “more
frequent and more aggressive.”133 The court rejected the defendant’s argument
that his actions were because she had taken on a second job as an exotic dancer
and not because of her gender, finding that the defendant’s conduct towards the
plaintiff “likely occurred ‘because of [her] sex.’”134 Thus, while sexual
harassment claims may protect legal sex workers, this protection is somewhat
limited in that it protects against harassment after it occurs but does not
necessarily preclude the employer from taking an adverse employment action
against the employee upon discovering he or she engages or has engaged in legal
sex work. This is because, while both Title VII discrimination and sexual
harassment claims allow for injunctive relief after a violation has occurred, Title
127. No. DKC 10-2480, 2012 WL 261196 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2012).
128. Under the quid pro quo theory of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must establish five elements
in order to show a prima facie case:
(1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3)
the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) her reaction to the harassment affected
tangible aspects of compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; and (5) the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and took no effective remedial action.
Id. at *7.
129. Id. Under a hostile environment theory, a plaintiff must establish four elements to
demonstrate a prima facie case of sexual harassment: “(1) she was subjected to unwelcome conduct; (2)
the unwelcome conduct was based on sex; (3) the conduct was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter
the conditions of employment and to create a hostile work environment; and (4) some basis exists for
imputing liability to the employer.” Id.
130. Id. at *1.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *2.
134. Id. at *7–8.
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VII attempts to prevent discrimination from occurring in the first place; Title
VII requires nondiscriminatory employment practices, while sexual harassment
claims function to remedy unlawful treatment after it has already taken place.135
C.

Potential Retaliation Protection

Finally, Title VII’s prohibition of retaliation may provide limited
protection for legal sex workers facing employment discrimination. Retaliation
claims require a showing that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected
participation in any Title VII investigation, proceeding, hearing, or opposition
to any unlawful employment practice; (2) the employer imposed an adverse
employment action in response to such participation; and (3) the plaintiff’s
protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action.136
If a plaintiff were able to show that they opposed their employer’s
unlawful employment practices, such as sexual harassment in the workplace, and
that the employer took an adverse employment action against them in response,
they may have a cognizable Title VII retaliation claim. For example, in Crawford
v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,137 the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro”), began investigating
rumors of sexual harassment by an employee, Gene Hughes.138 During the
course of this investigation, Metro asked another employee, Vicky Crawford,
whether she had observed Hughes acting inappropriately on any occasion, after
which she outlined instances of his sexually harassing behavior.139 Upon
completion of the investigation, Metro declined to take action against Hughes
but fired Crawford along with two other accusers.140
The Supreme Court explained that under Title VII retaliation, “nothing
in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports
discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same
discrimination . . . when her boss asks her a question.”141 Thus, the Supreme
Court held that under Title VII retaliation, actionable opposition includes both
affirmatively initiating a discussion as well as responding to questions during
an already existing investigation.142 As such, the Court found that Crawford did
have a cognizable claim for retaliation under Title VII stemming from Hughes’s
sexual harassment investigation.143 A contrary ruling, the Court stated, would
“undermine” Title VII’s primary objective of protecting employees from
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77–78 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352, 362 (2013).
555 U.S. 271 (2009).
Id. at 273–74.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id. at 277–78.
See id.
Id. at 280.
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harmful discriminatory behavior.144 Thus, if an individual who is engaged in
legal sex work experienced and reported sexual harassment in the workplace, he
or she would likely be protected from retaliation after either directly opposing
or questioning this harassment or participating in any investigation.
This provides legal sex workers with somewhat broader protection in that
it protects both male and female employees. However, this protection is still
limited because it first requires the employee face discrimination, then it
requires the employee to act in some way in response to that discrimination,
and finally, it requires the employer to take a tangible adverse employment
action against the employee. As with sexual harassment claims, retaliation
claims operate on an individual level of protection that only goes into effect
after harmful or unlawful activity occurs. As such, retaliation claims, unlike
Title VII discrimination claims, do not require the employer to establish
practices and policies that prevent unlawful discrimination against a protected
class.
Taken together, Title VII, as it is currently interpreted and applied, may
provide legal sex workers with limited protection through disparate impact,
sexual harassment, and retaliation claims. However, these protections contain
significant gaps and limitations: they provide unequal protections for male and
female sex workers, and they operate only after unlawful acts have occurred
rather than trying to eliminate discriminatory practices from the start. As such,
a shift in Title VII jurisprudence is needed to ensure Title VII’s purpose—to
encourage employers to make employment decisions based on job qualifications
and not on protected classifications145—is properly effectuated. Such a shift
towards a broader definition of “because of sex” would align with the scant
legislative history of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination, would follow
the current trend of a broader interpretation of sex discrimination, and would
provide individuals with protection from sex discrimination based on their
choice to engage in legal sex work.
IV. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LEGAL SEX WORKERS IS DISCRIMINATION
“BECAUSE OF SEX”
The Court’s narrow interpretation of “because of sex” historically focused
on “traditional concept[s]” of sex that “sorted men and women into two
perfectly sex-differentiated groups in order to preserve the traditional gendered
organization of the workplace.”146 Further, the “parameters of Title VII’s
prohibition of sex discrimination have always been determined by normative
144. Id. at 279.
145. See 110 CONG. REC. 7247 (1964); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
146. Franklin, supra note 65, at 1308.
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judgments . . . that reflect and reinforce conventional understandings of sex and
family roles.”147 However, courts are increasingly rejecting this strict maleversus-female dichotomy and are instead willing to expand Title VII to protect
people not just from discrimination based solely on an individual’s sex but also
legal rights that are based on, and are extensions of, an individual’s sex.148 As
normative judgments around the definitions of sex and gender shift, courts have
broadened their interpretation of Title VII to protect individuals against
discrimination stemming from pregnancy, marriage status, sexual harassment,
gender stereotyping, sexual orientation, and gender identity.149 Given that Title
VII’s stated purpose is to provide equality in the work place, especially for
minorities and women,150 discrimination based on one’s decision to engage in
legal sex work appears to be in line with the very type of discrimination Title
VII was intended to prevent. Thus, courts’ interpretation of “because of sex”
needs to be broadened to prohibit employment discrimination against an
employee based on the individual’s engagement in legal sex work.
A.

Legal Support for a Broader Definition of “Because of Sex”

Title VII was meant to balance an employee’s right to be free from
discrimination based on protected characteristics and an employer’s freedom of
choice in its employment decisions.151 In passing Title VII, Congress hoped
employers “would focus on the qualifications of the applicant or employee”
rather than on protected characteristics when making employment decisions.152
The relatively nonexistent legislative history surrounding the addition of sex as
a protected class under Title VII has left courts with little to rely on when
interpreting sex discrimination.153 As a result, the narrow, “traditional concept”
of sex seems to be an “invented tradition,” whereby courts claim to rely on
historical tradition to support the interpretation of Title VII sex discrimination
as “refer[ring]—always and only—to practices that divide men and women into
two groups perfectly differentiated along biological sex lines.”154 Thus, courts
relied on the meager legislative history to limit Title VII’s definition of “because
of sex.”155 But it is at least equally likely that this lack of legislative history allows
courts to take a more dynamic,156 expansive view of “because of sex” when
147. Id.
148. See supra Section II.B.
149. Id.
150. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(b) (2021).
151. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
152. Id. at 243; 110 CONG. REC. 7247 (1964).
153. See Shulda, supra note 65, at 55–56; Franklin, supra note 65, at 1312, 1317.
154. Franklin, supra note 65, at 1308, 1313.
155. Id. at 1319.
156. Id. at 1318.
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applying Title VII to reach the level of protection the statute guarantees. Three
sex discrimination cases demonstrate the Supreme Court’s increasing
willingness to adopt a broader understanding of “because of sex” in analyzing
Title VII disparate treatment claims.
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that gender stereotyping is
prohibited sex discrimination under Title VII.157 The Court explained that
employers could no longer rely on stereotypes in assessing an employee’s job
performance insofar as they embody the stereotypes associated with their
gender. This is because by precluding sex discrimination in the first place,
“Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”158 The Court noted that “[a]n
employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose position requires
this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a
job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.”159 Title VII
therefore aims to resolve that dilemma. Thus, the Court looked beyond mere
categorization of an employee as biologically male or female, and instead
protected the right to express oneself free from the confines of strict stereotypes
of gender and sexuality. Because “gender play[s] a motivating part” in
employment decisions based on an individual’s failure to conform to gender
stereotypes, the Court held that such decisions are prohibited by Title VII.160
Similarly, in Oncale, the Supreme Court held that same-sex sexual
harassment is prohibited by Title VII and that protection against sex
discrimination covers both men and women.161 While the Court acknowledged
that “male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII,” it
nevertheless determined that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”162 This reflects the Court’s
willingness to look beyond the limited legislative history behind Title VII’s
congressional history when interpreting “because of sex.”
Finally, in Bostock, the Supreme Court held that “because of sex” was not
just limited to “traditional concepts” of the strict male-versus-female
dichotomy, but instead included both sexual orientation and gender identity.163
The Court explained that Title VII does not “care if an employer treats men
and women comparably as groups; an employer who fires both lesbians and gay

157. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
158. Id. (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 250, 258.
161. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
162. Id.
163. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
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men equally doesn’t diminish but doubles its liability.”164 Notably, the Court
rejected the employer’s and the dissent’s argument that “because few in 1964
expected today’s result, we should not dare to admit that it follows ineluctably
from the statutory text.”165 The Court noted that Title VII’s language is
expansive,166 and as a result, “many, maybe most, applications of Title VII’s sex
provisions were ‘unanticipated’ at the time of the law’s adoption. In fact, many
now-obvious applications met with heated opposition early on, even among
those tasked with enforcing the law.”167 However, the Court explained that
Congress’s focus on holding employers liable for discrimination against
individuals overall rather than just precluding discrimination between classes of
individuals “virtually guaranteed that unexpected applications would emerge
over time.”168 Further, the Court stated that nothing in the Act’s limited
legislative history requires that it should be read narrowly.169 Instead, the Court
seems willing to broaden its interpretation of “because of sex” in ways that,
while potentially unexpected, do follow from the text.170 Thus, the Court
recognized that “because of sex” is not strictly limited to what Congress would
have expected at the time Title VII was written and that the limited legislative
history likely supports a broader interpretation of “because of sex.”
Together, these three cases illustrate the Court’s increased willingness to
expand its interpretation of Title VII’s definition of “because of sex.” Instead
of relying on the limited legislative history, the Court is taking a broader
understanding of “because of sex” to protect legal rights that are logical
extensions of an individual’s sex, such as its protections for sexual orientation
and gender identity. Given the close relationship between an individual’s
sexuality and the choice to engage in legal sex work, society’s changing attitudes
towards sex,171 and the increasing availability of spaces to participate in legal sex
work,172 there is some support for a broader definition of “because of sex”
enabling Title VII to protect against discrimination based on that decision.
Further, such an expanded definition would better serve Title VII’s goal of
ensuring employers focused on actual qualifications, rather than protected
characteristics, when making employment decisions.173

164. Id. at 1748.
165. Id. at 1750.
166. Id. at 1752 (quoting Franklin, supra note 65, at 1338).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1753.
169. Id. at 1752.
170. Id. at 1750.
171. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 40–58 and accompanying text.
173. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; 110 CONG. REC. 7247 (1964).

100 N.C. L. REV. 883 (2022)

908
B.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

Title VII Disparate Treatment Claims Under a Broader Definition of “Because
of Sex”

A broadened interpretation of “because of sex” would follow the Court’s
path of providing increased protections to individuals who, through their
choices, do not fit neatly within prescribed gender roles and stereotypes. It
would also allow Title VII to better protect individuals who face discrimination
based on decisions related to their sex. Specifically, such an interpretation
would protect an individual’s right to make choices that are legal extensions of
their sex, including an individual’s choice to engage in legal sex work; such a
decision is permitted by law and is a mode of self-expression inextricably linked
to an individual’s sex. Rather than cabining Title VII sex discrimination
jurisprudence to protect only against practices that explicitly distinguish
between men and women based on biological sex, this broader interpretation
would reflect the actual text of the statute. Thus, discrimination against legal
sex workers could be properly viewed as discrimination “because of sex.” This
would impact future Title VII discrimination claims by eliminating the existing
gaps and limitations in the current sex discrimination jurisprudence.
Title VII disparate treatment claims follow the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework,174 and courts have held that discrimination based on an
individual’s current or former employment in legal sex work “is not the kind of
discrimination that Title VII . . . [was] designed to protect against.”175 Further,
comparative evidence is often the strongest evidence in disparate treatment
cases, but this requires sex discrimination plaintiffs to produce opposite-sex
comparators, which “has a devastating effect on plaintiffs’ ability to win sexbased Title VII claims, as adequate comparators are rarely available in the
contemporary workplace.”176 Consequently, this requirement all but precludes
legal sex workers from filing disparate treatment claims.
Conversely, moving away from the male-versus-female dichotomy and
instead embracing a broader definition of “because of sex” that includes legal
expressions or extensions of an individual’s sex would make Title VII sex
discrimination claims more available to legal sex workers. In making out a prima
facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas test, legal sex workers
would be able to demonstrate that they are part of a protected class under this
expanded definition of “because of sex.” Because the decision to engage in legal
sex work is a legal choice directly related to an individual’s sex,177 it would be

174. See supra Section II.A.1.
175. See, e.g., Hettler v. Intrepid Detective Agency, Inc., No. 17cv1646, 2019 WL 2267286, at *1–
2 (M.D. Pa. May 28, 2019) (rejecting the plaintiff’s gender stereotyping claim that she faced sex
discrimination based on her prior employment as an exotic dancer).
176. Franklin, supra note 65, at 1311.
177. See supra Part I.
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protected as “because of sex,” and, therefore, those who engage in legal sex work
would be part of a Title VII protected class.
In meeting the second element of the McDonnell Douglas test, the
individual would simply need to show that their employer knew they were part
of that protected class—that is, that they knew the employee was engaged in
legal sex work. This would include situations in which the employee told their
employer directly that they engaged in legal sex work, or where the employer
found out through other means.178 Next, the individual would need to show that
their employer took adverse employment action against them. This could
include, among other things, being rejected in a hiring decision or being fired.179
Finally, the individual would need to demonstrate that others outside of
the protected class—in this instance, those who do not engage in legal sex
work—who are otherwise similarly situated were not subject to the same
adverse treatment. Under this broadened definition of “because of sex,” the
comparator issue would largely be alleviated.180 Instead of having to rely on
demonstrating opposite-sex comparator evidence as currently required by Title
VII, a plaintiff would be able to provide comparator evidence by comparing
those who engage in legal sex work against those who do not. Instead of
requiring a comparison between women who engage in sex work versus men
who engage in sex work—which is unlikely to be available for most employment
practices—this application would leave plaintiffs with a better chance of
proving actual discrimination by broadening the requirement for comparator

178. For example, see Lauren Kwei’s case, supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
179. Title VII does not define what constitutes an “adverse employment action,” resulting in much
confusion as courts analyze whether specific practices violate Title VII. See Esperanza N. Sanchez,
Note, Analytical Nightmare: The Materially Adverse Action Requirement in Disparate Treatment Cases, 67
CATH. U. L. REV. 575, 578–79 (2018). See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of
“Adverse Employment Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims:
What Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623 (2003) (exploring how this confusion
creates yet another barrier to equal opportunities promised by Title VII). Determining whether an
employer’s action rises to the level of an actionable adverse employment action is a nuanced and factspecific determination which presents additional Title VII barriers beyond the scope of this Comment.
For a broader discussion of the adverse employment action analysis, see Levinson, supra.
180. Already, the EEOC and Congress have both rejected the assertion that comparators are
required to establish sex discrimination under Title VII. See Franklin, supra note 65, at 1369–72.
“[H]istory does not compel the rule that plaintiffs cannot win Title VII claims in the absence of
comparator evidence.” Id. at 1372. Similarly, courts are increasingly rejecting the need for comparators
in sex stereotyping cases. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Chadwick v.
Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2009); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist.,
365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737–48 (2020)
(“Title VII’s plain terms and our precedents don’t care if an employer treats men and women
comparably as groups.”). Instead, when an employer makes an adverse employment decision in which
“sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role,” that employer violates Title VII. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at
1737.
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evidence. This, in turn, would provide a higher level of protection for women,
men, and minorities engaged in sex work than Title VII currently provides.
Once the plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of sex
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action. The employer’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons would depend on the specific facts of each case but
would likely include either that moonlighting181 distracts the employee from
their job or that legal sex work is immoral.182 Once the employer has provided
nondiscriminatory reasons, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove
that those reasons were pretext for the adverse action and that discrimination
occurred.
In the event that the employer attempts to argue that engaging in legal sex
work, or moonlighting, diminishes an employee’s focus on their more
“traditional” job or reduces their availability to work, it would not be difficult
to demonstrate this is merely pretext for discrimination. Employees often
undertake multiple jobs to help make ends meet,183 including engaging in legal
sex work.184 Thus, to show the proffered reason is pretext, the plaintiff would
need to demonstrate that other employees in similar jobs at that company also
have additional jobs to earn supplemental income. This demonstration could
include, for example, babysitting, working as a waitress, or driving for Uber.
Showing that the employer permitted employees to participate in many other
secondary jobs but fired an individual for engaging in sex work as a second
source of income would indicate that the employer’s adverse action was “because
of sex” in violation of Title VII, rather than because of a nondiscriminatory,
legitimate business need to keep employees focused on work.
A second argument employers will likely make is that legal sex work is
immoral and that, by taking an adverse action, they were acting on their

181. Moonlighting is a term that refers to working multiple jobs. Glossary, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/glossary [https://perma.cc/UB7P-VHTN]. As of
September 2021, roughly 4.6% of workers (7.045 million) held multiple jobs at the same time, with
4.8% of employed women (3.502 million) holding multiple jobs, compared to a rate of 4.3% of
employed men (3.530 million). BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., USDL-21-1799, THE
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—SEPTEMBER 2021 tbl.A-9, tbl.A-16 (2021), https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN96-EC44].
182. Because this is limited to legal sex work, an illegality argument would not be available here.
See supra Part I. Additionally, companies may also argue that employing a legal sex worker will harm
their reputation and may result in financial losses. For a rejection of this argument, see infra Section
IV.C.2.
183. Roughly thirteen million workers in the United States have more than one job, and women
are more likely than men to have multiple jobs. See Julia Beckhusen, About 13M U.S. Workers Have
More Than One Job, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 18, 2019), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/
2019/06/about-thirteen-million-united-states-workers-have-more-than-one-job.html [https://perma.cc
/D4EX-HTWQ].
184. See supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
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company’s morality requirement for employment.185 This, too, is likely to fail
because it is not even pretext—it is discrimination in and of itself. Such an
argument relies on gender stereotypes and the traditional concept of “female
chastity; . . . the immorality of treating a person as a commercial sex object;
and . . . alleged specific empirical harms to the prostitute or patron.”186 By
relying on gender stereotypes to make a morality argument, the employer would
be in violation of Price Waterhouse, and any adverse actions against an individual
based on his or her decision to engage in legal sex work would be a violation of
Title VII.187 Further, the EEOC has instructed that “to the extent that either
[a] law or [a] contract conflicts with Title VII, it will not constitute an adequate
defense” and that any contract requirements or workplace rules must not be
“enacted, used, or employed in such a manner that they discriminate on the
basis of . . . sex.”188 As a result, any morality clauses or similar contract
requirements or rules that contravene Title VII will likely be deemed invalid,
and will not provide an employer with a defense for sex discrimination.
Thus, by broadening the interpretation of “because of sex” to include
sexual expression and one’s choice to engage in legal sex work, successful
disparate treatment claims under Title VII would be available to individuals
who engage in legal sex work—including men, women, and sexual minorities—
and, as such, would better serve Title VII’s asserted purpose.
C.

Implications of a Broader Definition of “Because of Sex”

Broadening the definition of “because of sex” would better provide
individuals with the level of protection against sex discrimination Title VII
guarantees189 but would likely face three important challenges: the at-will
employment doctrine, social arguments from employers, and concerns that this
would begin a “slippery slope” for the degradation of Title VII jurisprudence.

185. For a general discussion of Judge Posner’s Moral Revitalization Theory, which asserts that
statutory interpretation should permit judges to account for shifts in moral and social attitudes when
interpreting Title VII, see generally Charles J. Ureña, Comment, Reading Sexual Orientation Protections
into Title VII: A Moral Revitalization Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1031
(advocating for the Moral Revitalization Theory).
186. See David A.J. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the
Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1250 (1979).
187. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Further, the Supreme Court has held that morality
alone was not a sufficient basis for legislation. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003). As such,
it is unclear whether a morality argument alone would be a permissible defense for discrimination.
188. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-1982-3, CM-613 TERMS,
CONDITIONS, AND PRIVILEGES OF EMPLOYMENT (1982).
189. While the focus of this Comment is on protecting legal sex workers, such a broadened
definition of “because of sex” would also protect those who engage in sexual behavior who do not
receive payment, but who face similar moral or judgment-based discrimination based on their choices
to engage in promiscuous or “objectionable” sexual expression.
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1. Social and Economic Implications of a Broader Definition of “Sex”
Since the passage of Title VII in 1964, employers and legislators have been
concerned that a broader definition of sex “would have sweeping implications
for the way that gender and the family were regulated in the United States.”190
These concerns still exist and dominate the discussion surrounding whether to
expand Title VII’s definition of sex.191 As such, critics of Title VII are often
focused on maintaining the rigid traditional gender norms that were reinforced
and protected by Title VII’s “traditional concept” of sex as a binary division
between men and women.192 They also seek to reinforce the existing gender
stereotypes and related regulations that rely on the limited definition of what it
means to be a man or woman. And they are not wrong—broadening the
definition of “sex” under Title VII would have significant social and economic
implications.
Expanding Title VII’s definition of sex would necessarily lead to an array
of social, legal, and economic implications stemming from redefining traditional
norms and the way the United States regulates both gender and the family.
Gender identity, sexual orientation, and sexuality have always been hotly
debated subjects both in politics and in society. Those views, in turn, have
shaped and controlled the laws and regulations that rely on such limited
definitions of sex. This fact has not been lost on the Supreme Court, which has
discussed these opposing views at length.193
Employers raise a litany of concerns when confronted with the expansion
of Title VII, including that this broader definition of sex will impact the way
other federal, or even state, laws define and regulate sex, gender, and the family.
For example, the dissent in Bostock warned that broadening the definition of sex
under Title VII would “threaten freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and
personal privacy and safety.”194 In particular, the dissent expressed its concern
that broadening the definition of sex would affect a number of issues: an
employer’s freedom of decision; Title IX’s regulations surrounding bathrooms,
locker rooms, housing, and women’s sports; Title VII’s regulation of
professional sports; employment decisions by religious organizations;
healthcare regulation under the Affordable Care Act; freedom of speech
concerns surrounding the use of preferred pronouns; and the availability of

190. Franklin, supra note 65, at 1380.
191. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1769–72 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
192. Franklin, supra note 65, at 1380.
193. See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1769–72. While the majority focuses on the broad language of
the statute to determine that it protects gender identity and homosexuality, the dissent instead focuses
on the social beliefs surrounding sex and gender norms at the time of the statute’s enactment to argue
against expanding its current definition. Id.
194. Id. at 1778.

100 N.C. L. REV. 883 (2022)

2022]

BECAUSE OF SEX

913

Equal Protection Clause claims.195 In confronting these arguments, it is
important to note that Title VII already provides exceptions for making adverse
action decisions based on legitimate business necessities196 and religion.197 As for
the other arguments, this Comment maintains that the interpretation of Title
VII’s definition of sex needs to be expanded. As the Court in Bostock explained,
“[w]hether other policies and practices might or might not qualify as unlawful
discrimination or find justifications under other provisions of Title VII are
questions for future cases.”198 However, as society’s beliefs surrounding gender
identity, sexuality, and sexual orientation continue to expand, the law must keep
pace.199
Engaging in legal sex work is not only a choice, but a right. It is no
different than the choices to work as a waitress, to have children, or to get
married. It should not be up to the employer to police employees’ behavior after
they clock out. There are some things all individuals might like to keep private,
whether it be their smoking habits, medical conditions, or relationships. People
deserve to have some degree of separation between work and their personal
lives. And as long as their actions do not prevent them from getting the job
done, people should be allowed to make their own choices without having to be
afraid they might get fired for doing so. Further, both society and the courts
have shown an increasing willingness to protect an individual’s sexual
expression.200 Thus, under a broader definition of sex under Title VII, three key
arguments employers might raise—the at-will employment doctrine, morality,
and slippery slope arguments—will likely fail.
2. Analysis of the At-Will Employment Doctrine, Morality, and Slippery
Slope Arguments Under an Expanded Definition of Sex
Employers will likely argue that an expanded definition of “because of sex”
protecting legal sexual expressions under Title VII impermissibly interferes
with the at-will employment doctrine, is immoral, or creates a slippery slope
that could lead to unintended consequences in the future. The at-will
employment doctrine allows employers to fire employees at any time, for any

195. Id. at 1778–83.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
197. Id. § 2000e-2(e). For additional discussion of why religious arguments fail, see Bostock, 140 S.
Ct. at 1754.
198. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753.
199. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
200. See supra Section II.B.
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reason or for no reason at all.201 This right ends, however, when it intersects
with Title VII: “In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous
announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to
the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.”202 Further, “Title VII
eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise
preserving employers’ freedom of choice” and serves as a “balance between
employee rights and employer prerogatives.”203 Thus, an employer still has
broad discretion in making employment decisions; however, if those decisions
are in any way based on an employee’s sex, the employer would be in violation
of Title VII regardless of the potential economic or social impacts this may have
on the employer. As a result, under an expanded interpretation of the definition
of sex, if an employer were to fire an employee upon discovering he or she has
engaged, or currently engages, in legal sex work, the at-will employment
doctrine would not be a permissible defense. Because Congress has already
deemed sex-based employment decisions to be impermissible, basing
employment decisions on an individual’s sexual expression would be covered by
the language “because of sex” in Title VII and would be a limitation on the atwill employment doctrine. This in turn would further Title VII’s purpose of
protecting against sex discrimination and ensuring employment decisions are
based not on protected characteristics, but instead on the individual’s
qualifications and ability to perform the job at issue.
Another defense employers will likely assert in cases brought under this
expanded interpretation of Title VII’s “because of sex” is a variant of a social
argument against hiring or employing legal sex workers. One facet of this
argument may be that sex work is immoral,204 and that employing legal sex

201. See Chuck Henson, In Defense of McDonnell Douglas: The Domination of Title VII by the At-Will
Employment Doctrine, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 551, 556 (2015) (providing an in-depth analysis of the
intersection between Title VII and the at-will employment doctrine). Further, all fifty states and
Washington, D.C., are currently at-will employment states with varying degrees of protection and
exceptions. At Will Employment States 2021, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpop
ulationreview.com/state-rankings/at-will-employment-states [https://perma.cc/SJ3L-99ET]; At Will
Employment States: Everything You Need To Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://upcounsel.com/at-willemployment-states#at-will-employment-states [https://perma.cc/5JV5-NT4B]. Montana is the only
state that limits the doctrine to allow discharge without good cause only during a probationary period.
Josh Kirkpatrick, Michelle Gomez & Michael Wilson, Montana Makes Significant Changes to State
Employment Laws, SHRM (June 1, 2021), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-andcompliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/montana-makes-significant-changes-to-state-employmentlaws.aspx [https://perma.cc/5W74-MM7H].
202. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of the morality
argument).
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workers would reflect negatively on the employer. This argument, however, is
unlikely to succeed. As with the argument based on the at-will employment
doctrine, Title VII protects against employment decisions made “because of
sex,” and the potential economic or social impacts of requiring an employer to
employ legal sex workers are irrelevant. Because legal sex work would be
covered under the broader interpretation of “because of sex,” the fact that
employing a legal sex worker may reflect negatively on the employer’s
reputation is insufficient to overcome Title VII.205
Finally, employers are likely to make a slippery slope argument against
applying the broader definition of “because of sex,” arguing that “undesirable
policy consequences would follow” and that there would be no limiting factor
and no clear line for where Title VII sex discrimination would end.206 However,
the Supreme Court rejected both of these arguments in Bostock, noting that
while Title VII’s sex discrimination provision may be “difficult to control . . .
nothing in the meager legislative history of this provision suggests it was meant
to be read narrowly.”207 The Court stated that, when interpreting statutes, “[the
Court’s] role is limited to applying the law’s demands as faithfully as we can in
the cases that come before us . . . . And the same judicial humility that requires
us to refrain from adding to statutes requires us to refrain from diminishing
them.”208 As such, it is not up to the courts to draw lines that do not already
exist within Title VII; instead, they must apply Title VII as it was written and
leave decisions for creating limitations to its application to Congress. Further,
one important limitation would exist in that this protection would be limited to
legal sex work, which would guard against concerns for “undesirable policy
consequences” by confining Title VII protection of sex work to those activities
that society has already determined to be permissible.209 Thus, as in Bostock,
such a slippery slope argument would be unpersuasive in preventing a broader
interpretation of “because of sex” in Title VII sex discrimination cases.
D.

Alternative Recommendations

Although the focus of this Comment is on the interpretation of the
“because of sex” language in Title VII, there are two additional possible

205. It is not difficult to imagine a business in a small town facing disapproval from its citizens for
employing a legal sex worker. However, this argument was likely made at many points throughout
Title VII’s history in the context of employing women in a “man’s role,” or employing members of
racial minorities, and in those circumstances Title VII prevailed over prejudice and discrimination.
206. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1752–53 (2020).
207. Id. at 1752.
208. Id. at 1753.
209. See id. Notably, this would not protect individuals involved in prostitution or human
trafficking. However, if prostitution were to be decriminalized, this broadened interpretation of
“because of sex” would protect individuals engaged in prostitution as well.
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methods for providing broader protection for legal sex workers. While the
legislative history and recent cases support a broadened interpretation of
“because of sex,”210 such an expansion would be a significant shift in Title VII
jurisprudence. Thus, two potential alternatives that would require congressional
action, rather than judicial interpretation, are worth assessing.
The first alternative would be to amend Title VII to include protection
not just for the narrow status-based definition of sex, but also for sexual
expression. This could mirror Title VII’s religious protections, which extend to
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.”211 Thus, just
as Title VII protects both an individual’s religious beliefs and actions taken to
practice those beliefs, Title VII could be amended to protect not just an
individual’s sex, but actions taken to express one’s sex. While Congress clearly
knew how to provide such protection when enacting Title VII and chose not to,
the religious protection demonstrates that providing protection not just for a
status but also for expression of that status is not completely foreign and could
have support within Title VII itself. Further, society’s views towards sexuality
have shifted significantly since Title VII was enacted in 1964.212 This is reflected
in the shifts in Title VII sex discrimination jurisprudence and courts’ increasing
willingness to expand “because of sex” to include not just the male-versusfemale dichotomy but also legal extensions of sex.213 As such, it is possible that
Congress would be more willing to amend Title VII to protect both the status
aspect of sex as well as the expressive elements of sex.
A second alternative would be for Congress to enact a more generic, offthe-clock privacy protection separate from Title VII that prohibits lifestyle
discrimination. Lifestyle-discrimination statutes214 currently exist in a number
of states.215 These statutes typically protect employees from being fired for
engaging in lawful conduct, such as smoking, drinking, or risky behavior, while

210. See supra Section IV.A.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
212. See supra Part I.
213. See supra Section II.B.
214. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?: Limiting the Use of
Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 640–70
(2004) (describing existing state lifestyle-discrimination laws).
215. Legislative Briefing Kit: Lifestyle Discrimination in the Workplace, ACLU, https://www.aclu.
org/other/legislative-briefing-kit-lifestyle-discrimination-workplace [https://perma.cc/3VAN-9JTD]
(describing lifestyle discrimination laws in general and existing state lifestyle discrimination laws, and
providing a model federal law). Currently, twenty-one states have passed some form of lifestylediscrimination statute: Virginia, Oregon, Tennessee, Kentucky, Colorado, South Carolina, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Mississippi, Indiana, Oklahoma, New Hampshire,
Nevada, Maine, Connecticut, Arizona, New Jersey, Louisiana, and Illinois. See id.
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both off-duty and off-premises.216 However, a federal statute would provide
even more protection and would further Title VII’s goal of ensuring that
employment decisions are made based on actual qualifications. While a federal
law may face opposition from state governments arguing that it impermissibly
impedes on their authority, it is possible that such arguments will be rejected
given other federal statutes that protect other aspects of employees’ personal
lives.217 A federal lifestyle-discrimination statute would provide broader
protection against employment decisions being made based on off-duty
conduct, including sexual expression and an individual’s decision to engage in
legal sex work.218 This, in turn, would provide a higher level of protection for
legal sex workers than what currently exists under Title VII.
CONCLUSION
In passing Title VII, Congress sought to “provid[e] equality of
opportunity,”219 and “to promote [employment decisions] on the basis of job
qualifications, rather than on the basis of [protected classifications].”220
However, the current narrow interpretation of “because of sex” under Title VII
severely limits the statute’s ability to provide the protection its text guarantees
and leaves individuals who, like Lauren Kwei, choose to engage in legal sex work
without adequate protection from sex discrimination in employment. While
Title VII could be amended to provide clarification that legal extensions and
expressions of an individual’s sex are protected, the better option is to instead
read the statute and apply it as it is. Discriminating against an individual for his
or her choice to engage in legal sex work is discrimination “because of sex,” and,
by accurately interpreting Title VII’s language, courts will be able to better
fulfill Title VII’s intended purpose. As Kwei astutely pointed out, “as long as
216. Jean M. Roche, Why Can’t We Be Friends?: Why California Needs a Lifestyle Discrimination
Statute To Protect Employees from Employment Actions Based on Their Off-Duty Behavior, 7 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 187, 198 (2011).
217. See Pagnattaro, supra note 214, at 670–77 (describing federal employment laws that protect
aspects of employees’ personal lives, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, Title VII, the Employment Polygraph Protection Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and proposing a
federal lifestyle discrimination statute that would balance employees’ reasonable privacy rights with
the employers’ needs).
218. For a discussion of lifestyle discrimination, see generally NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST.,
LIFESTYLE DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYER CONTROL OF LEGAL OFF DUTY EMPLOYEE
ACTIVITIES, https://www.workrights.org/images/issue_PDFs/ld_Employer_Control.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M5US-29AP] (providing examples of lifestyle discrimination); Stephen D. Sugarman,
“Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377 (2003) (discussing
employer interests in regulating off-duty conduct).
219. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(b) (2021).
220. See 110 CONG. REC. 7247 (1964); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
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you’re not hurting anybody or hurting yourself, do what you want. Mind your
business.”221
LAUREN BOONE**
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